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1. Introduction
Artificial morality is an emerging field in the area of artificial intelligence. Artificial 
intelligence has the aim to model or simulate human cognitive abilities. Artificial morality, 
more specifically, explores whether and how artificial systems can be furnished with moral 
capacities. Machine ethics provides the theoretical and ethical framework for thinking 
about artificial morality (Misselhorn 2018). Artificial morality becomes an issue because 
the development of increasingly intelligent and autonomous technologies will eventually 
lead to these systems having to face morally problematic situations. In these situations, 
the systems cannot be fully controlled by human operators anymore because that would 
deprive them of the advantages that they have as autonomous systems
The aim of this article is to develop some strategies on how to proceed when trying 
to implement moral capacities in an elder care system. Elder care is a highly relevant area 
of application because due to the shortage of caregivers there is a growing interest in 
autonomous assistive systems that can be used in geriatric care environments. Yet, most 
applications do not consider ethical aspects explicitly (e.g. Bajo 2008; Zato Domínguez et al. 
2013; Parra et al. 2014; De Paz Santana 2015).1 In this area of application the deployment 
of autonomous artificial systems is, however, highly problematic from a moral point of 
view. Even if we take it for granted that it is undesirable to substitute machines for human 
caregivers, there will be many situations in which the behavior of a geriatric care system 
will, somehow, have to be morally regulated by itself. It will, hence, be important to think 
about developing machines which have the capacity for a certain amount of autonomous 
moral decision making. The relevant capacities may be called moral agency in a functional 
1  An exception is the pioneering and still actual work of the Andersons (2008; 2011) which is later 
discussed in more detail.
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sense (Wallach & Allen 2009; Misselhorn 2013; 2015; 2018). Yet, this theoretical debate 
is not the focus of this paper which concentrates on the more practical issue of developing 
a software module for a geriatric care robot that can take ethical decisions.
The basic idea is not to provide fixed moral standards for care robots, but it is rather 
shown how to proceed when trying to determine and implement the relevant moral 
capacities. Elder care was not just chosen as area of application because of its urgency 
and great moral relevance, but also because it shows that the implementation of moral 
capacities depends on the purpose and context for which an artificial system is designed.
The first part of the article is dedicated to different approaches to moral 
implementation: top-down, bottom up and hybrid. Since bottom-up approaches generate 
problems of operationalization, transparency and safety in practical contexts, top-down 
approaches seem to be best in the first instance. The second part, therefore, discusses 
the most detailed and promising top-down approach to implement moral capacities in 
a geriatric care system. It goes back to the pioneering work of Anderson and Anderson 
(2008; 2011). Yet, as the critical discussion will show, a hybrid approach is more apt 
for the area of geriatric care than a top-down approach. This is due to characteristic 
requirements of care as an area of application. The Andersons’ top-down approach is for 
methodological reasons not suited to meet these requirements. The third part provides 
the theoretical foundations for a hybrid approach based on Nussbaum’s capabilities view 
in ethics and describes the steps that have to be taken to implement such a view in a 
software module for a geriatric care robot. The last part examines in which sense one 
can ascribe moral capacities to the proposed system and draws a comparison between 
artificial and human moral agents.
2. Moral Implementation: Top-down, Bottom-up and Hybrid
 In the debate about the implementation of moral capacities in artificial systems 
one distinguishes between top-down, bottom-up and hybrid approaches (Wallach & 
Allen 2009). All three approaches bring together a certain ethical approach with a certain 
approach to software design. Top-down approaches combine an ethical view that regards 
moral capacities as an application of moral principles to particular cases with a top-down 
approach to software design. The basic idea is to formulate moral principles like Kant’s 
categorical imperative, the utilitarian principle of maximizing utility or Asimov’s three 
laws of robotics as rules in a software which is then supposed to derive what has to be 
morally done in a specific situation.
One of the challenges that such a software is facing is how to get from abstract 
moral principles to particular cases. Another problem is that that there is no consensus 
about moral principles, neither in the general public nor among philosophers. Our moral 
intuitions do not seem to speak clearly for or against Kantianism, Utilitarianism or any 
other approach. One might call this – adopting a term coined by John Rawls in the context 
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of political philosophy (Rawls 1993) – the fact of reasonable pluralism.
The most fundamental objection against top-down approaches regarding artificial 
morality is the so-called frame problem. Originally, the frame problem referred to a 
technical problem in logic-based artificial intelligence. Intuitively speaking the issue is 
sorting out relevant from irrelevant information. In its technical form the problem is that 
specifying the conditions which are affected by a system’s actions does in classical logic 
not license an inference to the conclusion that all other conditions remain fixed. Although 
the technical problem is largely considered as solved (even within strictly logic-based 
accounts), there remains a wider, philosophical version of the problem first stated by 
McCarthy and Hayes (1969) which is not yet close to a solution (Shanahan 2009).
The challenge is that potentially every new piece of information may have an 
impact on the whole cognitive system of an agent. This observation has been used as 
evidence against a computational approach to the mind since it seems to imply that 
central cognitive processes cannot be modelled by strictly general rules. A corresponding 
line of argument can also be turned against top-down approaches regarding artificial 
morality. As Horgan and Timmons (2009) point out, moral normativity is not fully 
systematizable by exceptionless general principles because of the frame problem. 
Fortunately, full systematizability is not required. Horgan and Timmons admit that a 
partial systematization of moral normativity via moral principles remains possible. The 
frame problem is, hence, not a knock-down argument against the possibility of top-down 
approaches to moral implementation.
 The alternative to top-down are bottom-up approaches which do not understand 
morality as rule-based. This view is closely related to moral particularism, a meta-ethical 
position which rejects the claim that there are strict moral principles and that moral 
capacities consist in the application of moral principles to particular cases (Dancy 2013). 
Moral particularists use to think of moral capacities in terms of practical wisdom or in 
analogy to perception as attending to the morally relevant features (or values) that a 
situation instantiates. Moral perception views emphasize the individual sensibility to the 
moral aspects of a situation (Nussbaum 1985). The concept of practical wisdom goes back 
to Aristotle who underlined the influence of contextual aspects which are induced by way 
of socialization or training. In order to bring these capacities about in artificial systems 
classical bottom-up approaches in software design (i.e. artificial neuronal networks) 
which start from finding relationships or patterns in various kinds of data have to be 
adapted to the constraints of moral learning.
Bottom-up approaches might teach us something about the phylo- and 
ontogenetical evolution of morality (e.g. Axelrod 1984). But they are of limited suitability 
for implementing moral capacities in autonomous artificial systems because they pose 
problems of operationalization, safety and acceptance. It is difficult to evaluate when 
precisely a system possesses the capacity for moral learning and how it will, in effect, 
evolve. There is no component or mechanism to point to which embodies the moral 
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capacities of the system. Since the behavior of such a system is hard to predict and 
explain, bottom-up approaches are hardly suitable for practical purposes because they 
might put potential users at risk. Moreover, it is difficult to reconstruct how a system 
arrived at a moral decision. This will probably diminish the acceptance of such a system’s 
moral decisions by the users. It is important that autonomous artificial systems do not 
just behave morally, as a matter of fact, but that the moral basis of their decisions is also 
transparent. Bottom-up approaches should, as a consequence, be restricted to narrowly 
confined and strictly controlled laboratory conditions.
Top-down and bottom-up are the most common ways to think about the 
implementation of moral capacities in artificial systems. It is, however, also possible 
to combine the virtues of both types of approaches. The resulting strategy is called 
hybrid approach. Hybrid approaches operate on the basis of a predefined framework 
of moral values which is then adapted to specific moral contexts by learning processes. 
Which values are given depends on the area of deployment of the system and its moral 
characteristics. Although hybrid approaches are promising, they are still in the early 
stages of development.
Yet, which approach to moral implementation should one chose? Unlike Wallach 
and Allen (2009) think, it does not make sense to answer this question in the abstract. It 
depends on the purpose and context of use for which a system is designed. An autonomous 
vehicle will demand a different approach to moral implementation than a domestic care 
robot. As will be shown in the next section by contrast with a top-down approach, a 
hybrid approach is particularly apt for a geriatric care system that is used in a domestic 
environment.
3. A Top-Down Approach to an Elder Care System
One of the few attempts to create an artificial system with moral capacities was 
provided by Anderson & Anderson (2008; 2011). They developed a top-down conception 
of an elder care software on the basis of moral principles. These moral principles are 
derived in the framework of a prima facie duty approach to ethical theory which goes back 
to W. D. Ross (1930). Ross held that there are a number of ethical principles which state 
– in contrast to more standard deontological theories like Kantianism or Utilitarianism – 
prima facie rather than absolute obligations. ‘Prima facie’ means in this context that these 
duties count in favor of the moral rightness of an action but may be outweighed by other 
factors. According to Ross, the prima facie duties are generated from the moral intuitions 
of “thoughtful and well-educated people” (Ross 1930, 41).
This is an important point at which Anderson and Anderson depart from Ross’s 
original account. They do not start from the moral intuitions of considerate ordinary 
people but take the intuitions of ethical experts as their measure. The experts’ moral 
intuitions are, from their point of view, best captured by the Principles of Biomedical Ethics 
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by Beauchamp and Childress (1979) who provide a slightly modified list of Ross’s prima 
facie duties for bioethics. Anderson and Anderson embrace thus a top-down approach 
to moral implementation. The principles adopted for their geriatric care system are the 
Principle of Autonomy, the Principle of Beneficence and the Principle of Nonmaleficence. The 
Principle of Autonomy requires that the system does – as far as possible – not interfere 
with the caretaker’s autonomy; the Principle of Beneficence states that the patient’s 
welfare should be promoted and the Principle of Nonmaleficence is supposed to preserve 
the patient from harm. Anderson and Anderson nourish the hope that their approach 
might provide insight into how moral learning is functioning in human beings.
This approach has three fundamental deficits: The first is its reliance on ethical 
experts. In contrast to experts in other fields, it is not clear how ethical experts distinguish 
themselves. Because of the reasonable pluralism of ethical doctrines discussed above 
there is much less unanimity than in other disciplines. Already the assumption that there 
are experts in ethical issues is not unproblematic. Should we not all be ethical experts 
with regard to the morally relevant situations that we encounter in everyday life? Beyond 
that there is the powerful idea of normative individualism which states that moral 
decisions must be justified in the light of the concerns and interests of the persons who 
are affected by it (von der Pfordten 2012). The persons concerned in geriatric care are 
in the first instance those in need of care, their relatives and the care givers. The most 
immediate and non-paternalistic way to take the concerns and interests of the parties 
involved into account is by asking them which moral values are most important to them 
in care environments. 
One might argue against this approach by pointing out that those concerned are 
not the right persons to consult with respect to these issues. One problem is, for instance, 
that those concerned might have so-called adaptive preference which are deformed by 
poverty, adverse social conditions or political oppression (Nussbaum 2001). In elder 
care one might think of old people who do not believe that they deserve certain goods 
or treatments, or, at the extreme, even have a right to live because they feel useless for 
society. 
However, the right way to avoid this kind of problem is not to let experts decide 
instead of those concerned. Such an approach does not consider to the fundamental 
nature of reasonable pluralism in ethical issues. It is constitutive of liberal democracies 
that people have the right to choose their own conception of the good and that there are 
many different and incompatible views about what the good is. This restricts the role of 
“ethical experts” severely. The best way to avoid distortions as adaptive preferences is to 
not just simply register the views of those concerned but to discuss these problems in 
focus groups or qualitative interviews with them.
Secondly, the three principles implemented by Anderson and Anderson certainly 
play a role in geriatric care. But they are not differentiated enough to capture all the 
morally relevant aspects of situations in geriatric care. One must, for instance, distinguish 
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between physical health and mental well-being. Moreover, there are other relevant moral 
values like the dignity and self-respect of care-dependent persons, their bodily integrity 
or the privacy of the data that such a system generates. 
The third deficit concerns the lack of flexibility of Anderson’s and Anderson’s 
approach. Although the system is capable to generate abstract rules from a number of 
samples, these rules themselves remain rigid. The system displays a certain amount 
of moral learning, but it is blind to the needs and moral values of the individual care-
dependent persons. This is all the more important since people might diverge in their 
moral evaluation of a care situation, as will become apparent. The step towards a 
context-sensitive system that individually adapts to the moral values of care-dependent 
persons is for Anderson and Anderson blocked for methodological reasons. Since they 
do not involve the care-recipients’ moral perspective, but delegate moral judgments to 
ethical experts, the system cannot be sensitive to the moral values of the individual care-
dependent persons. 
Because of the shortcomings of Anderson’s and Anderson’s approach which is the 
most detailed and promising attempt to implement moral capacities in a geriatric care 
system, we have to look for an alternative. The deficits of their approach have to do with 
its top-down character. An obvious alternative is to opt for hybrid approach in contrast. 
Such an approach has a top-down element as long as it operates within a pre-defined 
framework of moral values that are relevant in care. At the same time, it might be bottom-
up if it is capable of moral learning by adapting to the way in which individual users weigh 
these values. A hybrid approach is ideally suited to incorporate the perspective of those 
concerned and to provide the level of differentiation and flexibility that is desirable in 
such a system.
4. A Hybrid Approach to a Software Module for Geriatric Care
A good starting point in ethics for such a hybrid system is Martha Nussbaum’s 
capability approach (Nussbaum & Sen 1993; Nussbaum 2006). The approach determines 
capabilities that human beings need for well-being and to which they are morally 
entitled, e.g., life, bodily health and integrity, but also the exercise of one’s cognitive and 
sensual capacities and the possibility to form a conception of the good. The definition of 
capabilities which are necessary for well-being also helps to avoid the problem of adaptive 
preferences discussed in the last section.
Coeckelbergh (2012) was the first to apply the capability approach to care robots. 
An aspect that has, so far, not been sufficiently considered is the context sensitivity of 
the capabilities, specifically in dependence of the individual life span (Misselhorn et 
al. 2013). People evaluate different kinds of capabilities in different phases of their life 
differently. Since it is difficult to anticipate the change of perspective for people who have 
not yet reached old age, it is particularly important to consider the moral perspective of 
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the individuals concerned in geriatric care. Moreover, not all old people will weigh moral 
values in the same way. Autonomy, physical health, and privacy are among the moral 
values that are relevant in geriatric care. But old people may differ regarding the weight 
that they ascribe to these values absolutely and relatively in comparison to each other 
(Misselhorn et al. 2013).
If the question as to which decision is morally adequate in a geriatric care situation 
is supposed to be answered from the perspective of those concerned, it has to be 
determined, first, which moral values they regard as important and, secondly, how they 
weigh them. A good way to find out about these matters are surveys. Much can be learned 
in this respect from the paradigm of experimental philosophy (Nichols & Knobe 2008). In 
contrast to Anderson and Anderson which take the judgment of ethical experts as their 
input, the aim of experimental philosophy is to find out what ordinary people think with 
regard to philosophical issues: “Although philosophers quite frequently make claims about 
‘what people would ordinarily say’, they rarely back up those claims by actually asking 
people and looking for patterns in their responses” (Knobe 2004, 37). The instruments 
and measures of experimental philosophy were originally not designed to find out which 
moral values are important for the elderly with respect to care and how they weigh them; 
nevertheless, these devices are of help. So far, such an approach has not yet been realized 
but in the next section a roadmap will be outlined which describes the steps that one has 
to take when attempting to design an ethically appropriate elder care system.
 As a first step one has to identify the relevant moral values in geriatric care, for 
instance, with the help of qualitative interviews. The results of these interviews should be 
a list of the moral values that the individuals concerned consider as relevant in geriatric 
care. The capabilities approach introduced above is an ethical framework that can be 
used to individuate and categorize the relevant values. A critical discussion with ethicists 
in focus groups could be used to avoid distortions such as adaptive preferences.
In a second step these values have to be operationalized such that an artificial system 
is able to recognize them and weigh them according to the moral value profile of the user. 
This can be done on the basis of scenarios as they are used in the surveys of experimental 
philosophy. These scenarios will have to deal with the moral aspects of daily routines 
in geriatric care, particularly situations in which different moral values get into conflict. 
Typical conflicts with regard to elder care are, for instance: How often and how obtrusively 
is a geriatric care system supposed to intervene if a care-recipient is not moving? This 
is a conflict between autonomy and health. Individuals who fear that something could 
happen to them might welcome such interventions. Persons who set great value on 
autonomy might, in contrast, get rather annoyed. Should the system monitor and register 
the medical status of the care-dependent person constantly and report it to a hospital or 
care facility? The conflict that arises in this case concerns privacy and health. Those who 
are very worried about their health and less so about issues of privacy might favor this 
option whereas people who are more concerned about privacy might be sensitive to such 
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attempts.2 
In a third step, the results have to be implemented such that an artificial system can 
recognize the moral value profile of its user and react accordingly. The moral scenarios 
have to be translated in terms of information processing and must be transformed into 
algorithms.
Fourthly, the system is set up for use. During a training phase the system asks the 
user to choose different options with regard to a range of presented scenarios and builds 
on this basis a model of the moral value profile of the users, i.e., which moral values the user 
cherishes and how they are ranked in comparison to each other. The most straightforward 
way to do this is to use a textual interface. It might also be eventually possible to classify 
the evaluations of the scenarios by the user with the help of an emotion-recognition 
software. On the basis of this information the system tries to adapt its behavior in new 
cases to the moral value profile of the user. If it finds out, for instance, that a user ranks 
autonomy high and is not very worried that something could happen to him or her, it will 
intervene less obtrusively than in the case of user profiles that are structured the other 
way around. 
Yet, the system’s capacity of moral learning should not be restricted to the training 
phase. The system should constantly adjust its model of the user’s moral value profile by 
interacting with the user and giving him or her the possibility to evaluate the adequacy of 
the system’s decisions. In addition to the capacity for moral learning, the system should 
also have a self-monitoring function and regularly provide status reports whether it is 
functioning correctly. If this is not the case the system should inform the user and even 
turn itself off if there is a serious problem of safety. This is important in order to not put 
the user at risk if the system is not functioning properly.
Although such a system could be very helpful for elderly people there are three 
caveats in place. The first one arises regarding the transfer of this model to other areas 
of application. Although these results might seem quite intriguing at first glance, it would 
be a mistake to confer them straight-forwardly to other cases. Self-driving vehicles, for 
instance, operate under quite different conditions. Because of the fact that these devices 
do not just have effects on their users but affect a much larger group of people, it would be 
inadequate to make the decisions of such a system dependent on the owner’s individual 
moral value profile as this can be done in the case of the envisaged geriatric care system 
which is only interacting with one user.
The second caveat is that the proposed system cannot even be used in all geriatric 
contexts. It is designed for domestic care. The target group would be people who are not 
cognitively impaired and can still take fundamental decisions regarding their life. Even 
2  An important point to which an anonymous reviewer adverted is that the evaluation of the 
scenarios might depend on whether they are formulated in way that involves the judging person 
or as interaction of others. It is an empirical question whether this has an influence on the moral 
judgments of the subjects or not. If it should turn out that this is the case one has to discuss, though, 
whether this has an impact on the classification of the subjects’ responses as moral evaluations.
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so they are physically frail and cannot stay without permanent care in their domestic 
environment. Since they do not want to move to a residence and do either not have the 
resources to hire a human care-giver or do not want to have one in their private setting, 
they would be willing to buy a care system but lack the technical know-how to install 
such a complex device according to their moral value profile. In contrast to other care 
systems (e.g. Bajo et al. 2008; Zato Domínguez et al. 2013) the proposed software module 
is, hence, not designed for the use in elder care residences.
This also explains why the focus of the approach is on the moral values of the 
care-dependent individuals and does not consider the relatives or caregivers. It is the 
care-dependent person who should decide which moral values are realized in his or her 
care-environment, as long as he or she still has the cognitive capacities to do so. This 
is required out of respect for the care-receivers’ autonomy and takes into account the 
reasonable pluralism with regard to ethical matters in liberal democracies. The suggestion 
is by no means to replace human caregivers generally by geriatric care robots. But for 
people who conform to the requirements specified above, purchasing a care system that 
is capable of moral decision making and learning in the above explained way might be a 
viable alternative that allows them to stay in their home and live autonomously as long 
as possible.
The third caveat concerns the question whether one can really ascribe moral 
capacities to the outlined system. As will be argued in the next section, such a system may 
possess moral capacities in a functional sense. Nevertheless, it is important to realize that 
this does not mean that the system is morally on a par with human moral agents.
5. Artificial and Human Moral Agents
The system outlined has basic moral capacities: it learns by training and interacting 
with the user to recognize and weigh moral values as specified by the capabilities approach 
in alignment with the user’s moral value profile and adapts its behavior accordingly. It is 
able to learn what is morally good or bad and even treats persons in line with moral 
standards that these people endorse. The system, therefore, meets the three basic criteria 
for agency that were developed by Floridi and Sanders (2004) for artificial systems: It is 
interacting with its user, it is initiating actions without an external stimulus (it reminds 
the user, for instance, to take his or her medicine when it finds that the user has not taken 
it in due time), and it displays adaptivity, since it is able to change its moral evaluations in 
order to conform to the user’s moral value profile.
One has to be aware, though, that this primitive form of moral agency which the 
artificial system displays does not amount to full moral agency as it pertains to human 
beings. Wallach and Allen discriminate between different levels of moral agency along 
two dimensions (Wallach & Allen 2009, 26): autonomy and ethical sensitivity. A simple 
tool like a hammer does neither possess autonomy nor ethical sensitivity, but a child 
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safety lock does involve a certain ethical sensitivity despite lacking autonomy. Its ethical 
sensitivity is entirely owed to the designer and user of the object. For this reason, Wallach 
and Allen speak of operational morality. Generally, both dimensions are independent of 
each other. There are, on the one hand, systems which possess a high degree of autonomy, 
but no (or only few) ethical sensitivity, e.g. an autopilot. On the other hand, there are 
systems with a high degree of ethical sensitivity but no (or a very low degree) of autonomy, 
e.g., the platform „MedEthEx“ (Anderson et al. 2006) which is a computer-based learning 
program in medical ethics and communication skills. 
The envisaged geriatric care system may claim functional morality which requires 
moral information processing. Yet, the proposed system does not attain full moral agency 
as mature human agents, not even in a functional sense. This is partly due to the fact that its 
moral competence is restricted to geriatric care situations with a particular user. Human 
morality has, in contrast, a much wider scope and potentially applies to any context. Full 
moral agency as assigned to human beings involves not just having the capacity of moral 
information processing, it encompasses a whole lot of intentional attitudes, phenomenal 
consciousness, free will and the capacity to make moral attitudes themselves the object 
of reflection and justification.
Phenomenal consciousness is important to get acquainted to the affective aspect of 
morality and to feel moral emotions like empathy, sympathy, guilt or shame. It concerns the 
way how these emotions feel like. Although there have been attempts to furnish artificial 
systems with states that are functionally equivalent to emotions like guilt, remorse or 
grief (Arkin 2007), what is left out is the feeling of the nagging quality of these moral 
emotions. Phenomenal consciousness is an important aspect of the richness of human 
moral life. The artificial system at issue can at most provide a functional equivalent of the 
cognitive aspects of human moral life in a highly restricted area.
Some argue that the availability of morally relevant information in the global 
workspace is a necessary condition for moral responsibility (Levy 2014). But it is not 
sufficient. An important aspect of moral responsibility is the capacity to deliberate about 
one’s moral reasons and the envisaged system cannot do this. Even if one is willing to 
speak of moral reasons in this case (Misselhorn 2013; Misselhorn 2018) such a system 
is not capable of reflecting about its moral reasons, not to mention of changing them by 
itself. It cannot justify the normative basis of its moral decisions and is incapable of taking 
into account other possible courses of action. 
The capacity of such higher-order reasoning is often regarded as a central tenet 
of freedom of the will (Frankfurt 1971) which the system is hence lacking. This is not 
a weakness but a strength in practical contexts. A system that were able to question its 
moral decisions or even to choose immoral courses of action would put the user severely 
at risk. This is not to say that it is impossible to build systems with these advanced moral 
capacities. Yet, they are not necessary nor desirable in a system with moral capacities that 
is suitable for the practical demands in contexts of domestic geriatric care.
A Softwaremodule for an Ethical Elder Care Robot.
Design and Implementation
78
6. Conclusion
The goal of this article was to show how an assistive system in geriatric care could 
sensibly be furnished with moral capacities. The first part of the article discussed three 
basic approaches to implementing moral capacities in artificial systems: top-down, 
bottom-up and hybrid approaches. They bring together a certain ethical approach with a 
certain approach to software design. Top-down approaches combine an ethical view that 
regards moral capacities as an application of moral principles to particular cases with 
a top-down methodology in software design. Bottom-up approaches, in contrast, bring 
together a particularist view in ethics with bottom-up approaches in software design (i.e. 
artificial neuronal networks). Hybrid approaches try to unite the virtues of the other two 
approaches while avoiding their shortcomings. They operate on the basis of a predefined 
framework of moral values which is then adapted to specific moral contexts by learning 
processes. Which approach to moral implementation one should choose depends on the 
purpose and the context of use for which an artificial system is designed. 
As became apparent hybrid approaches are particularly apt with regard to 
artificial systems that are designed for the context of geriatric care. The discussion of 
the approach of Anderson and Anderson (2008; 2011) showed the weaknesses of top-
down approaches in the area of geriatric care. It was criticized because of its reliance 
on experts, its coarseness and lack of flexibility. Alternatively, a hybrid approach was 
developed which uses the tools of experimental philosophy in order to identify, discuss 
and operationalize the moral values regarding geriatric care of the persons concerned. A 
roadmap was suggested that outlines the steps that one has to take in order to design such 
a hybrid geriatric care system with moral capacities. The system under consideration is 
supposed to be able to identify the morally relevant aspects of geriatric care situations 
and act accordingly. It learns to build a model of the user’s moral value profile in a training 
phase and constantly adjusts this model by interacting with the user. 
In the last part, a comparison between the system’s moral performance and human 
moral agency was drawn. Although such a system does not possess moral agency as it 
pertains to human beings, it is an artificial moral agent that is not just able to recognize 
what is morally good and act accordingly. It is even capable of treating persons in line with 
moral standards that these persons endorse. These capacities might one day be of great 
importance for autonomous artificial systems that are taking care of elderly people who 
are still cognitively alert but physically impaired such that they can stay in their domestic 
environment and live autonomously as long as possible.
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Abstract: The development of increasingly intelligent and autonomous technologies will 
eventually lead to these systems having to face morally problematic situations. This is 
particularly true of artificial systems that are used in geriatric care environments. The 
goal of this article is to describe how one can approach the design of an elder care robot 
which is capable of moral decision-making and moral learning. A conceptual design for the 
development of such a system is provided and the steps that are necessary to implement 
it are described.
Keywords: artificial morality; machine ethics; moral implementation; assistive systems 
in geriatric care; care robots; capabilities; experimental philosophy.
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